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Are you a Good Employee or Simply a Good Guy?
Influence Costs and Contract Design
May 20, 2013
Abstract
We develop a principal-agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to
a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft behavioral signal (the supervision signal) about the agent’s
level of eﬀort. In our model, the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral
signal. These activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task.
We show that the agent’s ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low-powered incentives and
increases the cost of implementing the eﬃcient equilibrium as a result. Interestingly, the fact that manip-
ulation activities entail productivity losses may lead to the design of influence-free contracts that deter
manipulation and lead to high-powered incentives. This result implies that the optimal contract (and
whether manipulation is tolerated in equilibrium or not) depends on the magnitude of the productivity-
based influence costs. We show that it may be optimal for the principal not to supervise the agent, even
if the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low (JEL D23, D82).
Keywords: principal-agent model with supervision, moral hazard problem, contract design, influence
activities, manipulation, productivity-based influence costs, power of incentives.
1 Introduction
Recent financial scandals including the Madoﬀ’s case of felony or the distortion of budget figures by the Greek
government, raise questions about the manipulability of information. In this article we study this issue in a
principal-agent setup, in which the agent is given the possibility to influence the principal’s evaluation of his
work by manipulating certain pieces of information through the use of influence activities that distort the
principal’s evaluation of his performance if the principal engages in supervision.1 Examples in that direction
1Hereafter, we use the feminine pronouns for the principal and masculine for the agent.
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include an agent who invites his boss for a coﬀee or an agent who dresses or behaves in a particular way to
make his supervisor feel he is more professional.
We assume that these activities have a cost for the agent and are aimed to manipulate the behavioral
signal collected by the principal. This way of modeling influence is related to the work of Mullainathan,
Schwartzstein and Shleiﬀer (2008) who consider the idea of associative thinking. In their framework, individ-
uals classify situations into categories, and transfer the informational content of a given signal from situations
in a category where it is useful to those where it is not.2 Applying this concept to our model, the principal
who dedicates time to monitor the agent will find it diﬃcult to distinguish the following positive pieces of
information ”The agent is a hard-working (good) employee” and ”The agent is a good person”. These pieces
of information belong to two diﬀerent categories, work abilities and personality, and the diﬃculty for the
principal is to disentangle signals that concern the contribution of their employee to the firm and the ones
that relate to personal characteristics. Specifically, we model influence as a reduced form of coarse thinking
by considering that the principal suﬀers from biased information processing a` la Be´nabou and Tirole (2002).
As a result, the principal may misperceive a negative behavioral signal about the level of eﬀort of the agent
as being positive.
A comprehensive analysis of the manipulability of information requires a precise understanding of the
relation between the concepts of hard and soft information. In the finance literature, hard information is
defined as being quantitative (Berger et al., 2001; Stein, 2002; Petersen, 2004; Liberti and Mian, 2009). Hard
information is assumed to be easy to store, to be transmitted in impersonal ways and to be independent of
the collection process; all these features making it a priori diﬃcult for hard information to be manipulated.
Further, research on supervision and delegation in principal-agent models refer to hard information as being
verifiable (Tirole, 1986) whereas soft information is considered to be unverifiable (Baliga, 1999; Faure-
Grimaud, Laﬀont and Martimort, 2003). In these models, a signal is unverifiable whenever it cannot be
observed by a third party (the ”judge”). Manipulability of information implies that soft information can be
distorted whereas hard information can simply be hidden.
In the current article, we consider a principal-agent model, in which the principal has access to both,
hard and soft information about the agent’s level of eﬀort. We assume that hard information cannot be
manipulated whereas soft information is subject to manipulation attempts. In our framework, agents do not
distort or hide their own pieces of information but undertake influence activities in order to manipulate the
soft signal collected by the principal.
2Persuasion has also been modeled using an informational approach (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Dewatripont and Tirole,
1999).
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The consideration of both hard and soft signals relates our study to the literature on subjective evaluations
(Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1994; MacLeod, 2003). In our model, similarly to the analysis developed in
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994), the principal can propose contingent contracts that depend on a hard
signal (determined by the level of production) as well as on a soft (behavioral) signal, which provides
additional information about the level of eﬀort of the agent. However, in contrast with the model of Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy (1994) and the general framework of MacLeod (2003), we assume that both the
principal and the agent agree on the value of the soft signal so that the signal can be treated as if it were
verifiable. As a result, we can disentangle the issues related to the unverifiability of subjective evaluations
(MacLeod, 2003) from the issues related to the manipulability of such evaluations.
1.1 The costs and benefits of influence activities
Influence activities have been identified as actions completed by organizational members in order to bias the
decisions of managers toward more pay and promotions (Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988, 1992).3
As a general principle, this analysis suggests that influence costs can be reduced by limiting the discretion
of decision makers for those decisions that have a significant impact on the distribution of rents inside the
organizations but that have minor impact on the firm’s profits.4
In our model, we focus on optimal contracts rather than organizational design as a mechanism to reduce
influence costs. In our framework, influence costs are not only incurred by the agent. Influence activities
may also entail costs in terms of the firm’s productive activities as is suggested in the original definition of
Milgrom (1988).
”That time of course is valuable; if it were not wasted in influence activities, it could be used for
directly productive activities or simply consumed as leisure.”
We assume that influence activities are unverifiable so that the principal cannot prevent influence simply
by punishing manipulation attempts. In our model, influence activities tend to reduce aggregate welfare by
increasing information asymmetry between principal and agent. As a result, the agent’s ability to manipulate
the soft signal increases the cost of implementing the high level of eﬀort in equilibrium.
Our approach diﬀers from the model developed by Maggi and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1995) in which agents
can distort the principal’s private information in order to reduce information asymmetry. In their setting,
3Also, notice that influence costs have been considered as a key element of the theory of the firm (Gibbons, 2005).
4Milgrom (1988) also mentions the use of compensation schemes as one of the possible instruments with which to reduce
influence activities. In particular, the author puts forward that the compression of wage diﬀerentials between current jobs and
promotion jobs is an eﬀective strategy for reducing incentives to influence the manager’s promotion decision.
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information distortion may actually allow for the falsification of information in equilibrium, and as a result,
may increase aggregate welfare. Relatedly, Croker and Morgan (1998) study sharecropping and insurance
optimal contracts showing that falsification is pervasive in equilibrium. In their setup, the agent who
possesses private information about the contractible outcome (e.g., the size of the crop or the value of a
loss) will misreport it in equilibrium given that the optimal contract provides overinsurance for small losses
and underinsurance for severe ones. Misreporting in a principal-agent setting has also been studied in
contexts in which the result of the privately observed information is aﬀected by the agent undertaking a
hidden action (Crocker and Slemrod, 2007; Crocker and Gresik, 2011; Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic, 2012;
Roger, 2012).5
1.2 Incentive Schemes under Influence
In our setting, the principal will decide upon the optimal incentive scheme by comparing influence contracts
that tolerate some influence activities in equilibrium and influence-free contracts that eliminate all manip-
ulation attempts. In our framework, there exists conditions, which critically depend on the magnitude of
influence costs, under which influence-free contracts are dominated by contracts that permit some degree of
influence. The main diﬀerence between our work and the previous literature on information manipulation
(Maggi and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 1995; Crocker and Morgan, 1998; Crocker and Slemrod, 2007; Crocker and
Gresik, 2011; Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic, 2012; Royer, 2012) is that influence activities are modeled
diﬀerently from falsification. In falsification models, an agent observes a piece of information privately which
he can choose to manipulate or not at a personal cost. In our influence model, the agent does not have
any private information regarding the behavioral signal which he may attempt to influence. As a result, the
application of the revelation principle to our setting is trivial.
We show that the cost of implementing the eﬃcient equilibrium increases as the behavioral signal becomes
more manipulable and influence activities are more pervasive. This occurs because in the presence of influence
activities the principal relies on less informative signals and must, as a result, increase the variance of wages
in order to keep incentives intact. This implies that a larger rent will have to be paid to the risk-averse agent
in order to ensure that the participation constraint holds. This result follows from Kim (1995) after showing
that the eﬃciency of the information structure decreases in the manipulability of the behavioral signal.
We show that optimal wages become more compressed and less volatile as the behavioral signal becomes
5The results in these papers diﬀer from Lacker and Weinberg (1989), who characterize the optimal contract that induces
no-manipulation in equilibrium. As is discussed by Croker and Morgan (1998), a correct application of the revelation principle
implies that the contract in Lacker and Weinberg (1989) will be dominated by one that allows for falsification.
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more manipulable. In addition, more weight is given to the hard signal in the payment scheme in the
presence of highly manipulable behavioral signals. These results are closely related to the suﬃcient statistic
theorem (Holmstro¨m, 1979; Banker and Datar, 1989) according to which incentive contracts must include
all the signals that are informative about the agent’s level of eﬀort. Indeed, incentive schemes will be less
responsive to the behavioral signal as it becomes more manipulable (and therefore less informative).6
Interestingly, our model of influence does not necessarily lead to low-powered incentives. The fact that
engaging in influence activities aﬀects the agent’s productivity negatively is crucial in understanding why
our model may induce high-powered incentives. Indeed, the principal who designs influence-free contracts
in equilibrium follows the strategy that consists of increasing the opportunity cost associated with influence
activities by increasing the incentives associated with the hard signal. In that case, influence activities
become less attractive as they reduce the probability that the agent will get the high payment associated
with a high level of performance on the hard signal. As a result, the principal may be willing to design
high-powered incentive contracts to deter influence activities. More specifically, we show that high-powered
incentives and influence-free contracts are more likely to be oﬀered to high-productivity agents for which
influence is especially costly in terms of firm productivity than to low-productivity agents. Also, we show that
the incentive contracts of high-productivity agents tend to be more responsive to the hard signal compared
with low-productivity agents.7
Finally, we show that the principal may decide not to supervise the agent in equilibrium, even though
the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low. Supervising the agent to collect an additional informative signal is
crucial for the principal’s ability to implement the high level of eﬀort. However, when the principal’s bias is
severe, it may become too costly for the principal to use the supervision signal to induce the agent to exert
high eﬀort. This is the case because a high level of manipulability of the supervision signal undermines its
informativeness significantly forcing the principal to increase wages to sustain the high level of eﬀort. In
that case, the principal may simply decide to change her strategy ceasing to supervise and incentivize the
6This finding is related to the result established in MacLeod (2003) in which wage compression occurs when the measures
of agent performance are subjective. However, the mechanism behind wage compression in MacLeod (2003) is diﬀerent from
ours. In the previous model, wage compression follows from the fact that subjective evaluations are unverifiable so that the
optimization problem of the principal includes the additional constraint that both the agent and the principal truthfully reveal
their private signals. Wage compression is also present in the model of influence activities in promotion decisions of Milgrom
(1988) in which the reduction in wage diﬀerentials between available jobs is found to be an optimal response against influence
activities.
7Note that our model does not consider heterogeneity of workers’ productivity levels so as to leave aside the problem of
adverse selection and focus on moral hazard. Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic (2012) combines moral hazard and adverse
selection in the context of performance manipulation.
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agent even in a context in which the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present our model in Section 2 and study influence and
influence-free contracts in Section 3. The analysis of the supervision decision is developed in Section 4. We
conclude in Section 5. All proofs are available in the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Description of Actions and Payoﬀs
We consider a principal-agent model with three stages described as follows.
• In Stage 1, the principal [she] sets a contract w that will be used to pay the agent [he] in the last stage
of the game. The contract is contingent on the level of production in the organization y ∈ Y := {0, 1},
which yields revenues R(y) for the principal, where R(0) < R(1) ≤ R¯. This level of production is a
hard and non-manipulable signal of the agent’s level of eﬀort.
In Stage 1, the principal also decides whether to engage in supervising the agent (s = 1) or not (s = 0)
in order to obtain the additional signal (v) about the agent’s level of eﬀort.8 The contract can be made
contingent on this supervision signal v ∈ V := {B,G} which costs φs ≥ 0 to the principal and which
is collected in Stage 3. This piece of information can be interpreted as a behavioral signal about the
employee’s performance where B means: the agent is a lazy (bad) employee and G means: the agent
is a hard-working (good) employee.
• In Stage 2, the agent decides whether to exert a high level of eﬀort (e = eH) or a low level of eﬀort
(e = eL) on a productive task, where eH > eL. The level of eﬀort (e) exerted by the agent on the
productive task aﬀects the level of production in the organization (y). The cost of eﬀort on the
productive task is denoted by φ (e) ≥ 0. We denote φe := φ (eH) > 0 and without loss of generality
assume that φ (eL) = 0.
In Stage 2, the agent also decides whether to undertake an influence activity (a = 1) or not (a = 0).
The personal cost for the agent of undertaking influence activities is denoted by φ(a) ≥ 0, where
φa := φ (1) > 0 and φ (0) = 0. We refer to φa as private influence costs in the remainder of the paper.
The objective of the influence activity is to aﬀect the evaluation of the principal with regard to the
agent’s actual level of eﬀort by distorting the principal’s perception (vs) of the supervision signal (v).
8This part of the game resembles models of costly acquisition of additional signals (Lambert, 1985).
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Our model builds on the idea that if the principal engages in supervision in Stage 1 and the agent
undertakes influence activities then she will not necessarily observe the true value of the supervision
signal v. Instead, the principal will observe vs which refers to the principal’s, possibly erroneous,
perception of the true signal. We describe the influence process in detail in Section 2.2.
• In Stage 3, the principal cannot observe the level of eﬀort on the productive task. However, the
principal observes the level of production as well as the behavioral signal if the principal decided to
supervise the agent. The principal then pays the agent according to the contract chosen in Stage 1. It
is assumed that the supervision signal when there is no influence from the agent (i.e. vs := v) satisfies
the condition that P [v = B | e = eL] = P [v = G | e = eH ] = ρv, where the precision of the behavioral
signal is denoted by ρv ∈
(
1
2 , 1
]
. We assume that if the agent does not undertake the influence activity,
then the level of output (y) satisfies the condition that P [y = 0 | e = eL] = P [y = 1 | e = eH ] = ρy,
where the precision of the hard signal is denoted by ρy ∈
(
1
2 , 1
]
.
The final payoﬀ for the principal is determined as follows.
UP := U(s, vs, w, y) = R(y)−wyvs−sφs, where y ∈ {0, 1} indicates the level of production and s ∈ {0, 1}
denotes whether supervision takes place (s = 1) or not (s = 0).
The final payoﬀ for the risk-averse agent is determined as follows.
UA := U(a, e, vs, w) = u(wyvs)− φ (e)− φ (a) > 0 where u
′ > ε > 0, u′′ < 0.9
We then denote wyvs∈ R the wage that is paid to the agent contingently on receiving signals y and vs.
We set the agent’s outside option u¯ = 0.
2.2 Assumptions
First recall that the principal does not directly observe the level of eﬀort of the agent on the productive task,
e ∈ {eL, eH} but she receives a hard signal on the level of eﬀort by observing output (y). The principal may
obtain an additional signal about the performance of her subordinate by engaging in supervision activities
at a cost. We assume that the supervisor’s perception of the behavioral signal (vs) can be manipulated by
influence activities (a). We model the influence of the agent on his supervisor’s assessments as a case of
biased attribution (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2002) in which the principal may mistakenly perceive a negative
signal about her employee as being positive as a result of influence activities. This biased attribution process
can be related to the concept of transference for which the characteristic of an agent as a person is associated
9We assume that the utility of the agent is separable in eﬀort and in the influence cost as is the case for example in MacLeod
(2003).
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with his quality as an employee even though in our context “being a good person” is not informative about
“being a good employee” (Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Schleiﬀer, 2008).10 In the following assumption,
we refer to π ∈ [0, 1] as the bias of the principal. In line with Be´nabou and Tirole (2002), we consider that
the principal and the agent are fully aware of the bias of the principal. We state these assumptions as follows.
Assumption I (The influence process)
If the agent decides to undertake an influence activity in Stage 2 (a = 1), then the principal will
perceive with probability π ∈ [0, 1] any behavioral signal as if it were good.
With probability (1− π) the principal uses standard Bayesian updating.
The bias of the principal π ∈ [0, 1] captures the diﬃculty of the supervisor to disentangle positive influence
behaviors (a = 1) from positive behavioral signals (v = G). Clearly the existence of this bias creates incentives
for the agent to manipulate the behavioral signal through influence activities. Since the principal is aware
of her own biases, she knows that perceiving her employee positively (vs = G) may not systematically imply
that the behavioral signal was positive given that, with probability π, the principal being under the influence
of the agent (a = 1) always perceives the behavioral signal positively.
In our model, influence activities are assumed to be costly for the organization as they detract workers
from their productive task (Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Influence activities are time-
consuming and undermine the quality of the work of the agent. This productivity-based influence cost
translates into the following assumption in which influence activities reduce the probability that the agent
obtains the high level of output for a given level of eﬀort. We refer to productivity-based influence costs as
influence costs in the remainder of the paper.
Assumption C (Influence costs and the value of the firm)
If the agent decides to undertake an influence activity ( a = 1), then P [y = 1 | e = eH ] =
(1− α) ρy and P [y = 1 | e = eL] = (1− α)
(
1− ρy
)
where α ∈ [0, 1] measures the influence cost.
One important feature of our model concerns the contractibility of the influence activity. We clarify this
point in Assumption O.
Assumption O (Observability of actions and signals)
i) The supervision signal vs is observable by both the agent and the principal.
ii) The influence activity (a ∈ {0, 1}) is not observed by the supervisor.
10We can also think of trust and positive reciprocity as important factors in explaining the supervisor’s biased perception of
the performance of the agent in the presence of influence activities (see Hosmer, 1995).
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The first part of Assumption O implies that both the principal and the agent agree on the value of signal
vs so that the supervision signal can be treated as if it were verifiable (see MacLeod, 2003). This is the
case if we assume that a third party can design a mechanism that would punish the agent and the principal
if they do not reveal the same value of the soft signal vs. The second part of Assumption O implies that
the influence activity is unverifiable by a third party so that the previously mentioned mechanism cannot
be applied and incentive contracts cannot be made contingent on the influence activity. These features of
our model allow us to disentangle the issues related to the fact that subjective evaluations are unverifiable
(MacLeod, 2003) from the issues related to the manipulability of such evaluations.
2.3 Definitions and Properties of Contracts
Next we introduce notations and definitions that will be useful to characterize the contracts derived in
Section 3. We denote by w = [w1G, w1B, w0G, w0B], where w ∈ R
4
+, the contract designed by the principal
in Stage 1 according to which the agent will be paid as a function of the hard and the behavioral signals.
The principal will implement the eﬃcient level of eﬀort eL or eH depending on the actual cost of inducing
high eﬀort. We denote by wˆ ∈ R4+ the contract that minimizes the cost for the principal of implementing
the high level of eﬀort. In Section 3, we characterize this contract in the presence of supervision by showing
how wages are aﬀected by an increase in a parameter κ (namely, the principal’s bias π or the influence costs
α).11
Definition 1 (Respective weights of hard and soft signals)
We say that an increase in a parameter (κ) raises the weight that is assigned to the hard (behavioral)
signal in the contract if ∂
∂κ
(w1B − w0G) > 0 (
∂
∂κ
(w0G − w1B) > 0).
In the following definition we assess the responsiveness of incentive contracts to hard and behavioral
signals. In particular we state that the power of incentives associated with a contract increases in a given
signal if the diﬀerence between wages following a low value of the signal and wages following a high value
11Our signals satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property so that the optimal contract is such that wˆ1vs ≥ wˆ0vs for any
vs ∈ {B,G} and wˆyG ≥ wˆyB for any y ∈ {0, 1}. For further details, see Corgnet and Rodriguez-Lara (2012), where we study in
detail two special cases of the current model: rational supervision (π = 0) and private influence costs (π > 0, α = 0). In both
setups, we characterize the optimal contract that implements the high level of eﬀort in the presence as well as in the absence
of supervision. Most of our results are in line with previous research such as Holmstro¨m (1979), Lambert (1985) and Banker
and Datar (1989), showing that the weight assigned to a signal increases in its precision. In addition, we show that as signal
precision decreases (as is the case for example when the behavioral signal is more manipulable), the cost of implementing the
high level of eﬀort decreases for the principal.
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of the signal increases. In that respect our definition of the power of incentives is related to the concept of
wage compression since a reduction in the power of incentives in both hard and behavioral signals implies
wage compression.
Definition 2 (Wage compression and the power of incentives)
i) We say that the power of incentives increases (decreases) in the hard signal (y) with respect to parameter
(κ) whenever ∂(w1vs−w0vs )
∂κ
> 0 (< 0) for any vs ∈ {B,G}.
ii) We say that the power of incentives increases (decreases) in the behavioral signal (vs) with respect to
the parameter (κ) whenever ∂(wyG−wyB)
∂k
> 0 (< 0) for any y ∈ {0, 1}.
3 Influence and Influence-free contracts
In this section, we characterize the properties of optimal incentive schemes by assuming that the principal
is willing to supervise the agent and induce him to exert high eﬀort in equilibrium.12 The principal has two
diﬀerent options when designing such schemes. On the one hand, the principal can propose influence contracts
for which she anticipates that, in equilibrium, agents will be willing to manipulate the behavioral signal. On
the other hand, the principal can deter manipulation attempts by proposing influence-free contracts. We
denote wˆI
[
wˆF
]
the wage vector that minimizes the cost of implementing the high level of eﬀort wˆIPI[
wˆFPF
]
, where PI
[
PF
]
is the probability vector associated with the case in which the agent exerts a high
level of eﬀort on the productive task and the principal tolerates [does not tolerate] influence from the agent.13
We will refer to wˆI and wˆF as the optimal influence and influence-free contracts, respectively.
The principal will design influence-free contracts instead of influence contracts in Stage 1 as long as the
following condition is satisfied:
αρy (R (1)−R(0)) + wˆ
IPI ≥ wˆFPF ⇔ R(1) ≥ RF>I :=
wˆFPF − wˆIPI
αρy
+R(0) (1)
⇔ α ≥ αf :=
wˆFPF − wˆIPI
ρ
y(R(1)−R(0))
This condition states that it is optimal for the principal to design influence-free contracts as long as the
cost of implementing an eﬃcient equilibrium under influence-free contracts is lower than under influence
contracts. The cost associated with the use of influence contracts consists of two parts: the reduction in the
12We study the principal’s decision to supervise the agent in Section 4, where we also discuss strategies inducing low eﬀort
in equilibrium.
13For simplicity we assume that wages are row vectors and probabilities are column vectors so as to avoid the use of transposes.
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revenues of the firm due to destructive influence activities
(
αρy (R (1)−R(0))
)
and the payment of wages to
the agent (wIPI). It is important to illustrate why, in our context, influence-free contracts may be dominated
by influence contracts implying that manipulation attempts can be observed in equilibrium. To that end,
we consider the case in which influence activities are eﬀective (0 < π < 1) but costless (α = φa = 0). In that
case, the agent will engage in influence activities as long as wages are higher when the principal collects a
good behavioral signal rather than a bad one (i.e. wyG > wyB). Consequently, influence-free contracts will
be such that the behavioral signal is ignored by the principal (wyG = wyB) and only the output signal can
be used to infer the agent’s level of eﬀort. In the case of influence contracts, the principal can use both
signals making the pay of the agent contingent on output as well as on the manipulated, though informative,
behavioral signal. Note that the behavioral signal continues to be informative for the principal even in
the presence of influence activities as long as π < 1. Following the result of Kim (1995) we conclude that
influence-free contracts, which are based on less information, are more costly to implement for the principal
than influence contracts in the current example.
3.1 Influence contracts
If the principal decides to supervise the agent in an eﬃcient equilibrium that induces high eﬀort, she can
allow for the influence activity by choosing a contract wˆI = (wˆI1G, wˆ
I
1B, wˆ
I
0G, wˆ
I
0B) that satisfies the condition
that the agent will perform the influence activity.14
Proposition 1 (Influence contracts and power of incentives)
i) The optimal influence contract that implements the eﬃcient level of eﬀort is such that an increase in
the principal’s bias (π) or that a decrease in influence costs (α) raises the weight that is assigned to the hard
signal.
ii) The optimal influence contract that implements the eﬃcient level of eﬀort is such that the power of
incentives decreases in the behavioral signal (vs) with respect to the principal’s bias (π) whereas the power of
incentives decreases in the hard signal with respect to influence costs (α).
iii) The principal’s cost of implementing the eﬃcient level of eﬀort increases in the principal’s bias (π)
and in the influence costs (α).
This proposition shows that the principal is willing to use the hard signal more intensively relative to the
behavioral signal as π increases since the accuracy of the behavioral signal decreases in the principal’s bias.
14We derive the condition under which the agent who is being supervised performs the influence activity in Lemma 1 in
the appendix. We note that for costless influence activities (φa = 0) the subset of optimal wages that satisfy the condition is
non-empty. In general, there exists an upper bound for influence activities costs for which the condition is satisfied.
11
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Interestingly, the proposition also shows that an increase in influence costs (α) tends to lower the weight
that is assigned to the hard and non-manipulable signal (y). This is the case because the accuracy of a
low level of output (y = 0) as a predictor of the level of eﬀort of the agent decreases as α rises. Indeed, in
the presence of influence costs, a low level of production can be attributed either to a low level of eﬀort or
to influence activities. This implies that a low output signal is interpreted less negatively in the presence
of influence costs, that is
∂wˆI0vs
∂α
> 0 for any vs ∈ {B,G}.15 In the extreme case in which influence costs
destroy the whole output (α = 1) the signal y = 0 is uninformative about the level of eﬀort of the agent. As
a result, the weight of the hard signal in the agent’s wage will be reduced as influence costs increase. Also,
applying Definition 2 we know that the power of incentives decreases in the hard signal with respect to α
since
∂wˆI0vs
∂α
> 0 and
∂wˆI1vs
∂α
= 0 for any vs ∈ {B,G}.
Finally, the proposition shows that the manipulability of the behavioral signal and the magnitude of
influence costs tend to increase the principal’s cost of implementing the eﬃcient level of eﬀort. This is the
case because an increase in π reduces the precision of the behavioral signal while an increase in α reduces
the precision of the hard signal. It follows that in the case of influence contracts, the more manipulable is
the behavioral signal and the larger are the influence costs, the less eﬀective is supervision as a disciplining
device for the agent. This implies that a larger rent will have to be paid to the risk-averse agent in order to
ensure that the participation constraint holds.
Our results suggest that the principal would be better-oﬀ in an organizational environment in which agents
do not have the possibility to influence her assessments. For example, supervisors may limit communication
with subordinates to avoid influence activities (Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988). They may
also design an organizational structure that limits interpersonal relationships between employees at diﬀerent
levels of the hierarchy. This can be achieved by having employees at diﬀerent layers of the hierarchy work at
diﬀerent locations as is the case in the increasingly popular virtual organizations. In that case, employees’
supervision is performed through computer-mediated communication systems.16 However, the quality of the
supervision signal may be undermined in those cases (Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1999). The optimal strategy
consists for the principal of finding the right balance between getting access to information about the agent’s
level of eﬀort while avoiding influence activities. An alternative solution to deter influence activities is to
design influence-free contracts.
15Note that the informativeness of the hard signal y = 1 is not aﬀected by α, that is
∂wˆι1vs
∂α
= 0 for any vs ∈ {B,G}.
16A large number of programs such as Spectorsoft, Virtual MonitoringTM, Employee Monitoring or Webwatcher are already
available to monitor employees’ activities. An early account of computer-based monitoring systems was considered in Chalykoﬀ
and Kochan (1989).
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3.2 Influence-free contracts
The principal needs not accept influence activities from the agent and may design influence-free contracts
that deter manipulation attempts. In that case, the principal will supervise the agent but in such a way
that the agent never conducts the influence activity. We denote by wˆF = (wˆF1G, wˆ
F
1B, wˆ
F
0G, wˆ
F
0B) the optimal
influence-free wage contract that induces a high level of eﬀort in equilibrium in the case of influence costs.
In the following proposition we characterize the main properties of the optimal influence-free contract wˆF ,
where we denote α¯ = max {α0,α1,αf} where α0 =
π(1−ρy)
(1−π)ρy
, α1 =
π(1−ρv)
(1−π)ρv+π
and αf = wˆ
F
P
F−wˆIPI
ρ
y(R(1)−R(0))
.
Proposition 2 (Influence-free contracts and power of incentives)
i) The optimal influence-free contract that implements the eﬃcient level of eﬀort is such that either an
increase in the principal’s bias (π) or an increase in influence costs (α) raises the weight that is assigned to
the hard signal.
ii) The optimal influence-free contract that implements the eﬃcient level of eﬀort is such that the power
of incentives decreases in the behavioral signal (vs) with respect to the principal’s bias (π). In addition, for
any α ≥ α¯, the power of incentives increases in the hard signal with respect to influence costs (α). As a
result, the variance of wages increases in influence costs (α).
iii) The principal’s cost of implementing the eﬃcient level of eﬀort increases in the principal’s bias (π)
but decreases in the influence costs (α).
Similarly to the case of influence contracts, influence-free contracts are such that the weight assigned
to behavioral signals decreases as the manipulability of the signal increases (π). Nonetheless, influence and
influence-free contracts diﬀer since an increase in influence costs (α) raises the weight that is assigned to the
hard signal in the case of influence-free contracts (Proposition 2i) while the opposite is true in the case of
influence contracts (Proposition 1i). The intuition for this result follows from the fact that, under influence-
free contracts, the principal uses the hard signal to deter influence activities. The principal increases the
opportunity cost of influence activities by increasing the incentives associated with the hard signal. In that
case, influence activities become less profitable as they reduce the probability that the agent will get the
high payment associated with a high level of performance on the hard signal. Consequently, the principal
will increase the weight given to the hard signal so as to discourage influence activities (see Proposition 2i).
The second part of Proposition 2 follows from the fact that for any α ≥ α¯ the following comparative
statics hold ∂wˆ
F
1G
∂α
> 0, ∂wˆ
F
1B
∂α
> 0, ∂wˆ
F
0G
∂α
< 0 and ∂wˆ
F
0B
∂α
< 0. Applying Definition 2, we conclude that, for any
α ≥ α¯, the power of incentives increases in the hard signal with respect to α. Notice that the threshold (α¯)
above which influence costs lead to an increase in the power of incentives increases in the principal’s bias
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(π). This occurs because for high values of π we obtain that ∂wˆ
F
∂α
≤ 0 in which case the power of incentives
does not increase in the hard signal with regard to influence costs. For large values of π the principal’s
mind is more manipulable and influence activities are more appealing to agents. As a result, eliminating
influence activities may require decreasing the pay associated with the good behavioral signal (
∂wˆFyG
∂α
< 0 for
any y ∈ {0, 1}) in addition to increasing the pay associated with a high level of output (
∂wˆF1vs
∂α
> 0 for any
vs ∈ {B,G}). If the former eﬀect dominates the latter then
∂wˆF1G
∂α
≤ 0.
The main implication of Proposition 2 is that influence-free contracts may significantly diﬀer from influ-
ence contracts with regard to the weight given to hard and behavioral signals. This finding suggests that in
the presence of influence costs workers with diﬀerent levels of productivity may be oﬀered diﬀerent types of
contracts.17 We elaborate on this conjecture in the next proposition by showing that high-powered incentives
and influence-free contracts are more likely to be oﬀered to agents for which influence is especially costly in
terms of firm productivity.
Proposition 3 If influence costs satisfy the condition that α ≥ α¯, then the wages oﬀered to low-productivity
agents
(
R (1) < RF>I
)
are less responsive to the hard signal than they are for high-productivity agents(
R (1) ≥ RF>I
)
.
This result follows from condition (1) according to which high-productivity workers (R (1) ≥ RF>I) will
be oﬀered influence-free contracts whereas low-productivity agents (R (1) < RF>I) will be oﬀered contracts
under which it is optimal for the agents to influence the principal’s perception of the behavioral signal. This
result is in line with the main findings in Green (1998) that studies the impact of skills on wages. Green
(1998) finds that computer skills (i.e., hard signals) are highly valued whereas communication skills (i.e.,
behavioral signals) have little impact on wages, so that workers at higher levels of the hierarchy receive wages
that are more responsive to the hard signal than to behavioral signals. More generally, our findings suggest
that top executives whose impact on firm value is supposedly high are more likely to be paid according to
hard signals than employees at lower levels of the hierarchy.
4 Supervision Decision
A principal who suﬀers from cognitive bias in the perception of the behavioral signal (π > 0) may decide
not to supervise the agent so as to avoid manipulation attempts. This may be beneficial for the firm when
influence costs are particularly high. Arguably, the behavioral signal may include additional information
17Although we refer to diﬀerent productivity levels, we should acknowledge that our model leaves aside the problem of adverse
selection while focusing on moral hazard; i.e., we do not consider diﬀerent types of agents in our setup.
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on the agent level of eﬀort that the principal may need in order to incentivate the agent to exert a high
level of eﬀort. This is the case because, with more information available, the principal is more likely to
detect possible shirking behaviors of her subordinate. The decision of supervising the agent or not will be
determined by comparing the informative value of the behavioral signal and its cost, which includes the
influence costs (α) and the cost of acquiring the signal (φs).
18 Our main result in this section (Proposition
4) states that the principal may decide not to supervise the agent, even if the cost of collecting the behavioral
signal is arbitrarily low.
To analyze whether supervision is optimal from the point of view of the principal, we will have to ensure
that implementing the high level of eﬀort in an equilibrium with supervision is preferred to implementing
the low level of eﬀort. That is, we will not assume as was the case in the previous section that the high
level of eﬀort is eﬃcient. We establish conditions under which it is optimal for the principal to supervise the
agent by describing the conditions under which each of the following four types of equilibria exist:
NL) The principal does not supervise the agent and the latter exerts low eﬀort.
NH) The principal does not supervise the agent and the latter exerts high eﬀort.
F ) The principal supervises the agent and uses influence-free contracts to induce high eﬀort.
I) The principal supervises the agent and uses influence contracts to induce high eﬀort.
We compare all strategies inducing a high level of eﬀort in equilibrium (NH , F and I) with the strategy
in which the principal implements the low level of eﬀort (NL). That is, we derive individual rationality
constraints for the principal in each of these three cases. Strategy NH , F and I are respectively preferred
to the implementation of the low eﬀort equilibrium (NL) if the following conditions are satisfied:19
R(1) ≥
wˆ
NHP
NH − u¯
2ρy − 1
+R(0) := RNH (2NH)
R(1) ≥
φs + wˆ
FPF − u¯
2ρy − 1
+R(0) := RF (2F )
R(1) ≥
φs + wˆ
IPI − u¯
2ρy − 1− αρy
+R(0) := RI (2I)
We know from the previous section that the cost of implementing high eﬀort increases in α in the
case of influence contracts while it decreases in α in the case of influence-free contracts. This implies that
∂RI
∂α
> 0 and ∂R
F
∂α
< 0. It also follows directly from condition (2NH) that
∂RNH
∂α
= 0 and it follows from
conditions (2F) and (2I) that ∂R
I
∂φs
> 0 and ∂R
F
∂φs
> 0. Using these properties along with the threshold
18In order to leave aside the uninteresting case in which the principal supervises the agent without inducing high eﬀort, we
assume that supervision costs (φs) are strictly positive.
19Condition (2I) holds as long as 2ρy − 1− αρy ̸= 0.
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RF>I := wˆ
F
P
F−wˆIPI
αρy
+ R(0) defined in condition (1) in Section 3.1, we can represent graphically the
equilibrium strategy that applies for a given set of values of R(1) and α. Note that ∂R
F>I
∂α > 0 because
wˆIPI is increasing in α while wˆFPF is decreasing in α (Propositions 1iii and 2iii). That is, influence-free
contracts will be more likely to arise in equilibrium as influence costs increase (see Figure 1 below).
In Figure 1, we represent the case in which the cost of supervision (φs) is arbitrarily low. We also consider
the situation in which influence contracts are preferred to influence contracts for α = 0. This condition holds
as long as wˆIPI < wˆFPF which will be the case for example if influence activities do not entail private
costs for the the agent (φa = 0). If this condition does not hold, the only two possible equilibrium strategies
will be either to supervise the agent using influence-free contracts or not to supervise the agent inducing a
low level of eﬀort in equilibrium.
Figure 1 around here
In the case in which supervision costs are high, the principal will not supervise the agent and will simply
choose between inducing the agent to exert high eﬀort (NH) or not (NL). The former strategy will be chosen
whenever the gains from high eﬀort (R(1)) are large enough.
In the following proposition we show that, even if supervision costs are arbitrarily low, the principal may
decide to avoid supervision. Given that supervision costs are arbitrarily low, we are in the case illustrated in
Figure 1 in which only three equilibrium strategies are possible: NL, F or I. In that context, let us consider
the situation in which influence activities are absent because the principal is not manipulable (π = 0). In
that case, we know that the principal will decide to supervise the agent since it is costless to do so and no
influence activities will be initiated in equilibrium. Now consider an increase in the principal’s bias. From
Propositions 1iii and 2iii, we know that the principal’s cost of implementing the high level of eﬀort increases
in π so that the thresholds RF and RI also increase in π. This implies that for suﬃciently high levels of the
principal’s bias none of conditions (2F ) and (2I) are likely to hold in which case the principal will prefer
not to supervise the agent and induce him to exert low eﬀort rather than supervising and incentivizing the
agent.
We denote by π− the level of the principal’s bias such that the principal is indiﬀerent between supervising
the agent and inducing him to exert high eﬀort and not supervising the agent without incentivizing him.
Formally, π− is defined, as the level of bias such that:
R(1) = min
{
RF , RI
}
(3)
Note that there always exists an interior solution π− ∈ (0, 1) for equation (3). From the proofs of Proposi-
tion 1iii and 2iii (see appendix) we know that ∂wˆ
F
P
F
∂ρy
< 0 and ∂wˆ
I
P
I
∂ρy
< 0 which implies that
∂min{RF ,RI}
∂ρy
< 0.
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Also, lim
ρy→1
min
{
RF , RI
}
= φs so that for φs arbitrarily low we have: R(1) > lim
ρy→1
min
{
RF , RI
}
. As a re-
sult, for a given π− ∈ (0, 1), there exists ρ−y ∈
(
1
2−α , 1
)
such that equation (3) is satisifed as long as
R(1) < lim
ρy→
1
2−α
min
{
RF , RI
}
where lim
ρy→
1
2−α
min
{
RF , RI
}
= 2−α
α
(
φs + wˆ
FPF − u¯
)
+R(0). There exists a
range of values α ∈ (0,α−) for which this condition holds since lim
α→0
2−α
α
(
φs + wˆ
FPF − u¯
)
+R(0) =∞ and
∂ 2−αα (φs+wˆ
F
P
F−u¯)
∂α
< 0.
Proposition 4 Given ρ−y and α ∈ (0,α
−), the principal will not be willing to supervise the agent for any
level of the bias above π−, even though the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low.
Supervising the agent to collect additional signals is crucial for the principal’s ability to implement the
high level of eﬀort. In case the principal’s bias increases, the precision of the behavioral signal obtained
through supervision is undermined. This forces the principal to increase wages to compensate the agent for
the increase in the variance of wages which follows from the use of a more noisy behavioral signal. If the
principal’s bias is particularly severe (above π−), the principal may simply decide to change her strategy
ceasing to supervise the agent and inducing him to exert low eﬀort.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the design of incentive contracts in a principal-agent model in which the agent had
the possibility to engage in influence activities and manipulate a behavioral signal which was collected by the
principal in the supervision process. We found that an increase in the manipulability of the behavioral signal
increases information asymmetry between the agent and the principal and increases the cost of implementing
the eﬃcient level of eﬀort as a result. Also, we showed that an increase in the manipulability of the behavioral
signal raises the weight assigned to the non-manipulable hard signal and decreases the power of incentives
associated with the behavioral signal whether the principal designs influence or influence-free contracts.
Interestingly, we identified fundamental diﬀerences between influence and influence-free contracts regard-
ing the eﬀect of an increase in influence costs. In particular, the weight assigned to the hard signal decreases
in the influence costs in the case of influence contracts while the opposite is true in the case of influence-free
contracts. This result holds because the principal who designs influence-free contracts aims at deterring
influence activities by increasing their opportunity cost which is achieved by raising the incentives associated
with the hard signal. More specifically, we show that high-powered incentives and influence-free contracts are
more likely to be assigned to agents for which influence is especially costly in terms of firm productivity. This
result is in line with empirical findings in Green (1998) showing that workers at higher levels of the hierarchy
17
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receive wages that are more responsive to the computer-based hard signal than to the communication-based
behavioral signal (see also Liberti and Mian 2009).
Finally, we showed that the principal may intentionally avoid supervising the agent when the manipula-
bility of the behavioral signal is high. This result holds even if the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low. This
is the case because inducing high eﬀort may become unsustainable for the principal as the manipulability
and thus the noisiness of the behavioral signal increases.
Although our model provides a generalization of the principal-agent model for the case in which some
signals are manipulable, we deliberately abstract away from the interesting case of multi-agent frameworks.
However, in their definition of influence activities, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) envisage not only personal
attempts to manipulate the principal’s view of oneself but also the time devoted by organizational members
to countervail the manipulation attempts of their coworkers. In order to apprehend influence activities at
the organizational level, extending our analysis to the case of multi-agent models with team production and
hierarchies may be a fruitful area for future research.
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6 Appendix
Lema 1 The agent who is supervised in an equilibrium that implements the high level of eﬀort performs
the influence activity if the following condition is satisfied.
(IA) (1− α)ρy
[
u
(
wI1G
)
− u
(
wI1B
)
] + ((1− ρy) + αρy)[u
(
wI0G
)
− u
(
wI0B
)]
> φa
π((1−ρy)+αρy)
Proof of Lema 1. We denote wI =
[
wI1,G, w
I
1,B, w
I
0,G, w
I
0,B
]
the vector of contingent wages that charac-
terize the influence contracts. We also denote PI1
[
PI0
]
the probability of receiving each of these payments
when exerting a high [low] level of eﬀort. In the case of influence contracts, the principal allows the agent
to engage in influence activities, paying the wages wI with probability PI1.
PI1 := (p
ι
i1)i∈{1,...,4} =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(1− α) ρy(ρv + π(1− ρv))
(1− α) ρy(1− π) (1− ρv)(
1− (1− α) ρy
)
(ρv + π(1 − ρv))(
1− (1− α) ρy
)
(1− π) (1− ρv)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
If the agent does not undertake the influence activity, then the probability of receiving these wages is
given by:
P1 = (pi1)i∈{1,...,4} =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(1− α)ρyρv
(1− α)ρy (1− ρv)(
1− (1 − α)ρy
)
ρv(
1− (1− α)ρy
)
(1− ρv)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Therefore, the agent undertakes the influence activity if and only if
u
(
wI
)
(PI1 −P1) > φa.
That is,
(IA) (1− α)ρy
[
u
(
wI1G
)
− u
(
wI1B
)
] + ((1 − ρy) + αρy)[u
(
wI0G
)
− u
(
wI0B
)]
>
φa
π((1−ρy)+αρy)
This condition states that the agent will undertake the influence activity as long as the benefits derived
from increasing the probability of receiving a high pay wyG instead of getting a low pay wyB (where wyB <
wyG for any y ∈ {0, 1}) are larger than the cost of the influence activity (φa). We can see in condition (IA)
that as the quality of the hard signal
(
ρy
)
rises, the incentives for the agent to undertake the influence activity
decrease. This occurs because as ρy increases, the distortion of the soft signal which is achieved through
influence activities becomes less eﬀective. For example, the soft signal will be ignored by the principal if the
hard signal is perfectly accurate (ρy = 1 and α = 0). Finally, notice that an increase in the principal’s bias
(π) facilitates influence activities as it lowers the right-hand side in condition (IA). The intuitive reasoning is
that an increase in π raises the manipulability of the soft signal so that the probability with which influence
activities turn a low pay (wyB) into a high pay (wyG) increases as well.
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Proof of Proposition 1. We defined PI1 above and
PI0 :=
(
pIi0
)
i∈{1,...,4}
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(1− α)
(
1− ρy
)
(1− ρv + πρv)
(1− α)
(
1− ρy
)
ρv(1− π)(
α+ (1− α) ρy
)
(1− ρv + πρv)(
α+ (1− α) ρy
)
ρv(1− π)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
We can derive the optimal contract under influence (wˆI) which solves:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1) wˆI = min
w∈R4
wPI1
(2) u (w)PI1 − φe ≥ 0 IR
(3) u (w)PI1 − φe ≥ u (w)P
I
0 IC
We first define u1G = u(wI1G), u1B = u(w
I
1B), u0G = u(w
I
0,G) and u0B = u(w
I
0,B) so that w
I
1G = h(u1G),
wI1B = h(u1B), w
I
0G = h(u0G) and w
I
0B = h(u0B) to ensure that the optimization program is concave (see
Laﬀont and Martimort 2002). Then, the first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and suﬃcient to
determine the optimal influence contract.⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1) wˆI = min
{(u0,u1)}
pI11h(u1G) + p
I
21h(u1B) + p
I
31h(u0G) + p
I
41h(u0B)
(2) pI11u1G + p
I
21u1G + p
I
31u1G + p
I
41u1G − φe ≥ 0 IR
(3) pI11u1G + p
I
21u1G + p
I
31u1G + p
I
41u1G − φe ≥
pI10u1G + p
I
20u1G + p
I
30u1G + p
I
40u1G IC
We denote λ and µ the non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated respectively with the incentive
compatibility (IC) constraint and the individual rationality (IR) constraint.20
The optimal influence contract satisfies that:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(11G) u′
(
wˆI1G
)
=
ρy(ρv+π(1−ρv))
λρy(ρv+π(1−ρv))+µ[(1−π)(ρv−ρy)−1]
(11B) u′
(
wˆI1B
)
=
ρy(1−ρv)
λρy(1−ρv)−µ(ρv−ρy)
(10G) u′
(
wˆI0G
)
=
(1−(1−α)ρy)[ρv+π(1−ρv)]
λ(1−(1−α)ρy)[ρv+π(1−ρv)]+µ(π−α)+α(ρv−ρy)+(1−π(1+α))(ρv−ρy)
(10B) u′
(
wˆI0B
)
=
(1−(1−α)ρy)(1−ρv)
λ(1−(1−α)ρy)(1−ρv)+µ[(ρv+ρy+α(ρv−ρy)−1)]
In order to investigate the properties that are satisfied by the optimal influence contract wˆI =
[
wˆI1G, wˆ
I
1B, wˆ
I
0G, wˆ
I
0B
]
,
we use the implicit function theorem in equations (11G) , (11B) , (10G) and (10B) . We obtain that,⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∂wˆI0G
∂π =
−(2ρv−1)((1−α)ρy−1)(1−α)ρyµ
u′′(wˆI0B)((π(ρv−1)−ρv)(1−(1−α)ρy)λ−µ((1−α)ρy−ρv+π((1−α)ρy+ρv−1))2
< 0
∂wˆI0G
∂α =
(2ρv−1)((1+ρv(π−1))(π(ρv−1)ρv)µ
u′′(wˆI0B)((π(ρv−1)−ρv)(1−(1−α)ρy)λ−µ((1−α)ρy−ρv+π((1−α)ρy+ρv−1))2
> 0
whereas
∂wˆI1B
∂π =
∂wˆI1B
∂α = 0
20We do not present the feasibility and Slackness conditions for simplicity. We find that in equilibrium µ > 0 and λ > 0 so
(IC) and (IR) are binding constraints (see Corgnet and Rodriguez-Lara 2012). MacLeod (2003) and Holmstro¨m (1979) find
exactly the same result. Hereafter, we focus on the case of µ > 0 and λ > 0.
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As a result, we conclude that the optimal influence contract that implements the eﬃcient equilibrium
satisfies the condition that an increase in either the principal’s bias (π) or the productivity-based influence
costs (α) raise the weight that is assigned to the hard signal (Proposition 1i). Using the implicit function
theorem we can also conclude that the power of incentives decreases in the soft signal (vs) with respect
to the principal’s bias (π) and the the power of incentives decreases in the hard signal (y) with respect to
productivity-based influence costs (α) (Proposition 1ii). This is the case because ∂wˆ
I
1G
∂π
< 0, ∂wˆ
I
1G
∂α
= 0 and
∂wˆI0B
∂π = 0,
∂wˆI0B
∂α > 0.
To demonstrate part iii) of the proposition, we use the result established by Kim (1995), showing that
an information structure P is more eﬃcient than an information structure Π if its likelihood ratio is a mean
preserving spread of that of Π.
We compute the following function:
Φ
(
ρpv, ρ
π
v , ρ
p
y, ρ
π
y ,π
)
:=
∑
i∈S
( p
I
i0
pIi 1
− pi0
pi1
)
Where ρji stands for the precision of signal i ∈ {v, y} of information structure j ∈ {P,Π} and Π := P
I
denotes the probability vector under influence.
Φ
(
ρv, ρv, ρy, ρy,π
)
=
(
(1−(1−α)ρy)(1−ρv+πρv)
(1−α)ρy [ρv+π(1−ρv)]
+
(1−α)ρy(1−ρv+πρv)
(1−(1−α)ρy)[ρv+π(1−ρv)]
)
−
(
(1−(1−α)ρy)(1−ρv)
(1−α)ρyρv
+
(1−α)ρy(1−ρv)
(1−(1−α)ρy)ρv
)
> 0
Since
∂
(
(1−(1−α)ρy)(1−ρv+πρv)
(1−α)ρy [ρv+π(1−ρv)]
+
(1−α)ρy(1−ρv+πρv)
(1−(1−α)ρy)[ρv+π(1−ρv)]
)
∂π
> 0. At the same time, we have that:
∂
(
(1−(1−α)ρy)(1−ρv)
(1−α)ρyρv
+
(1−α)ρy(1−ρv)
(1−(1−α)ρy)ρv
)
∂ρv
< 0. As a result, for any increase in the influence parameter from
π− to π+ the information structure P (ρv) is not as eﬃcient as Π (π
+, ρv) since then Φ > 0. In order to
make Π (π+, ρv) as eﬃcient as P we can consider the information structure P (ρ
−
v ) where ρ
−
v < ρv so that
Φ
(
ρ−v , ρv, ρy, ρy,π
+
)
= 0. As a result any increase in π reduces the eﬃciency of the information structure
Π.
These results show that an increase in the manipulability of the supervision signal reduces its infor-
mativeness implying that the cost of implementing the eﬃcient equilibrium increases with the bias of the
principal in the case of influence activities compared to the case of rational supervision. Also, an increase in
the precision of the soft signal decreases the cost of implementing the eﬃcient equilibrium more significantly
in the case of rational supervision than in the case of influence. This is the case, since under influence an
increase in the precision of the supervision signal is partially oﬀset by the fact that it can be distorted by
the subordinate. Finally, in the presence of influence activities an increase in the precision of the hard signal
tends to compensate for the low accuracy of the soft signal. In the extreme case in which the hard signal is
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perfectly informative
(
ρy = 1
)
the principal can infer the level of eﬀort of the agent whether the soft signal
is manipulable or not.
The same reasoning applies with respect to the productivity-based influence costs α. In particular, an
increase in α reduces the precision of the hard signal (y) leading to a less eﬃcient information structure.
Using the result of Kim (1995), this implies that an increase in α will increase the cost of implementing the
high level of eﬀort.
It is also the case that applying the same reasoning to the precision of the hard signal ρy we can show
that implement the high level of eﬀort is less costly as ρy increases. This is the case since:
∂
(
(1−(1−α)ρy)(1−ρv+πρv)
(1−α)ρy [ρv+π(1−ρv)]
+
(1−α)ρy(1−ρv+πρv)
(1−(1−α)ρy)[ρv+π(1−ρv)]
)
∂ρy
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. We denote wF =
[
wF1,G, w
F
1,B , w
F
0,G, w
F
0,B
]
the vector of contingent wages that
characterize the influence contracts. We also denote PF1
[
PF0
]
the probability of receiving each of these
payments when exerting a high [low] level of eﬀort.
We need to solve the following optimization problem.⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1) wˆF = min
w∈R4
wPF1
(2) u
(
wF
)
PF1 − φe ≥ u¯ IR
(3) u
(
wF
)
PF1 − φe ≥ u
(
wF
)
PF0 IC
(4) u
(
wF
)
PF1 ≥ u
(
wF
)
PI1 IF
We obtain the following first order conditions, where δ is the non-negative Lagrange multiplier associated
with restriction IF. We can see that λ > 0, µ > 0 and δ > 0.⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(11G) u′
(
wˆF1G
)
=
ρyρv
λρyρv+µ(ρy+ρv−1)+δ(ρyρv−(1−α)ρyρv−π(1−α)ρy(1−ρv))
(11B) u′
(
wˆF1B
)
=
(1−ρv)ρy
λ(1−ρv)ρy+µ(ρy−ρv)+δρy(1−ρv)(1−(1−α)(1−π))
(10G) u′
(
wˆF0G
)
=
(1−ρy)ρv
λ(1−ρy)ρv+µ(ρv−ρy)+δ((1−ρy)ρv−(1−(1−α)ρy)(ρv+π(1−ρv)))
(10B) u′
(
wˆF0B
)
=
(1−ρy)(1−ρv)
λ(1−ρy)(1−ρv)+µ(1−ρy−ρv)+δ(1−ρv)(1−ρy−(1−(1−α)ρy)(1−π))
If we use the implicit function theorem in these equations we can see that:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(11G)
∂wˆF1G
∂π
= −
(ρv−1)ρvρ
2
y(α−1)δ
u′′(wˆF1G)(π(ρv−1)ρy(α−1)δ+ρvρy(λ+αδ)+(ρy+ρv−1)µ)2
< 0
(11B)
∂wˆF1B
∂π
= −
(ρv−1)
2ρ2y(α−1)δ
u′′(wˆF1B)(π(α−1)δ−αδ−λ)(ρv−1)ρy+µ(ρv−ρy))2
> 0
(10G)
∂wˆF0G
∂π
= −
(ρv−1)ρv(1−ρy)
2(1+ρy(α−1))δ
u′′(wˆF0G)(π(ρv−1)(1+ρv(1−α))δ−ρvµ+ρv(λ−ρy(αδ+λ)+µ))2
< 0
(10B)
∂wˆF0B
∂π
= −
(ρv−1)
2(ρy−1)((ρy(α−1)+1))δ
u′′(wˆF0B)((ρv−1)(π(1+ρy(α−1))δ+λ−ρv(αδ+λ))+µ(ρv+ρy−1))2
> 0
Similarly, we conclude after some algebraic manipulations that:
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⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(11G)
∂wˆF1G
∂α > 0 for α > α1, where α1 =
π(1−ρv)
(1−π)ρv+π
.
(11B)
∂wˆF1B
∂α
> 0 for any α > 0.
(10G)
∂wˆF0G
∂α < 0 for any α > 0.
(10B)
∂wˆF0B
∂α
< 0 for any α > α0, where α0 =
π(1−ρy)
(1−π)ρy
.
Regarding the variance of wages (see Propositions 2ii) one can see the wage scheme as a mixed Bernoulli
distribution with parameter ζ so that the variance of wages σ2(w) in that case is such that: σ2(w) =
ζσ2(BG) + (1− ζ)σ2(BB) + ζ (1− ζ) [E(BG)− E(BG)]
2 where BG [BB ] is the Bernoulli distribution that
takes values w1G and w1B [w0G and w0B] with probability ρy and
(
1− ρy
)
respectively. To show that σ2(w)
increases in α we are left to demonstrate that ∂∂α [E(BG)− E(BG)] ≥ 0, that is to show that ρy (w1G − w1B)+(
1− ρy
)
(w0G − w0B) is increasing in α. We know that as α increases the (IF ) constraint is relaxed since costs
of influence increase for the agent and at the same time the power of incentives in the hard signal increases
in α as we have shown in the previous proposition. As a result, for (IF ) to be binding in equilibrium (it
has to be the case since δ > 0) it has to be that the benefits associated with influence rise to compensate an
increase in costs associated with the influence activity previously mentioned. That is, the power of incentives
in the soft signal has to increase with regard to α. This implies that both (w1G − w1B) and (w0G − w0B)
cannot decrease in α. This completes the proof that σ2(w) is increasing in α. Propositions 2i and 2ii follow
directly from these results.
To demonstrate part iii) of the proposition note that assessing the principal’s cost to implement the
eﬃcient level of eﬀort in the case of influence-free contracts crucially hinges on the influence-free constraint
(IF). Indeed, in the case of influence-free contracts neither π nor α aﬀect the precision of the signals received
by the principal in equilibrium. As a result, any eﬀect π and α on the cost of implementing the eﬃcient
level of eﬀort results from the eﬀect of these parameters on the influence-free constraint. This is what we
study next. Let us start by denoting IF = u
(
wF
) (
PF1 −P
I
1
)
. Using simple algebra we can establish the
following comparative statics for IF : ∂IF
∂α
> 0 and ∂IF
∂π
< 0. It follows from these comparative statics that
an increase in α or decrease in π will facilitate the implementation of influence-free contracts and then lower
the principal’s cost of implementing the eﬃcient level of eﬀort.
We can also show using the result established in Kim (1995) which is used in the proof of Proposition
1iii that implementing the high level of eﬀort is less costly as the precision of the hard signal ρy increases.
Proof of Proposition 3. We know from the analysis of section 3.2 that it is optimal for the principal
to design influence-free contracts as long as condition (1) is satisfied: αρy (R (1)−R(0)) + wˆ
IPI ≥ wˆFPF .
Also, we know from Propositions 1iii and 2iii that wˆIPI is increasing in α while wˆFPF is decreasing in
α. As a result, ∂R
F>I
∂α > 0 where R
F>I := wˆ
F
P
F−wˆIPI
αρy
+ R(0). We conclude that there exists a threshold
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for the principal’s revenues when output is high
(
RF>I
)
above which influence-free contracts are preferred
to influence contracts. This threshold decreases in α. It follows that there exists a level of productivity
above which high-productivity agents for which R(1) ≥ RF>I will face an influence-free contract whereas
low-productivity agents (R(1) < RF>I) get an influence contract.
Proof of Proposition 4. Main text.
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